Asymmetries in Attachments to Groups and to Their Members: Distinguishing Between Common-Identity and Common-Bond Groups

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Two studies sought to validate the distinction between common-identity groups, which are based on direct attachments to the group identity, and common-bond groups, which are based on attachments among group members. Study 1 focused on members of selective and nonselective university eating clubs. Study 2 focused on members of a diverse sample of campus groups. Both studies revealed asymmetries in group and member attachments: Individuals in common-identity groups were more attached to their group than to its members, whereas individuals in common-bond groups were as attached to the members as to the group (or more so). Study 2 also demonstrated that attachment to the group was more strongly related to various evaluations of individual group members in common-bond than in common-identity groups. The authors discuss the implications of these results for the development of groups over time and speculate on how the dynamics of the two types of groups might differ.

Describing the difference between Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope, Samuel Johnson observed that the former loved men but hated mankind whereas the latter loved mankind but hated men. Dr. Johnson's observation, in addition to its insight into the animuses of two literary luminaries, contains a provocative idea about the mental representation of groups: People's feelings toward a group (mankind) may be distinct from their feelings toward the members of that group (men). In addition, this observation suggests the hypothesis that individuals with a stronger attachment to their group than to its members can be meaningfully and qualitatively distinguished from individuals with stronger attachments to the members of their group than to the group itself. Intuitive as this prediction might have

seemed to Dr. Johnson, it has only recently begun to receive empirical and theoretical attention from social psychologists.

This lack of interest in the relation between attachments to groups and to their members is most likely due to the fact that these two types of attachment have been viewed instead as competing bases for groups. For most of this century, social psychology has been dominated by an individualistic conception of the group, by which groups are simply the sum of their individual parts. The manifesto of the individualist position was provided by Floyd Allport (1924) in his classic, *Social Psychology*. Allport began his text by dismissing the group as a meaningful unit of analysis, stating, "If we take care of the individual, psychologically speaking, the groups will take care of themselves" (p. 9). Forty years later, Allport's commitment to the individualist position had not diminished: "When the group dynamicist speaks of the 'attraction of the group for the individual' does he not mean just the attraction of the individuals for one another? If individuals are all drawn toward one another, are they not ipso facto drawn to the group?" (1962, pp. 23-24). Thus, for Allport and for successors to the individualist

position, any question of the relation between attachment to the group and attachment to the individual group members is meaningless. There can be no greater or lesser attachment to the group than to the individual members, because the group has no representation or reality distinct from that of its members. Humankind consists solely of the men and women who make it up, no more and no less.

In the last two decades, social identity theorists have mounted a serious challenge to the individualistic conception of groups (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1989; Tajfel, 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The heart of their attack rests on the findings of a fascinating series of studies on the minimal conditions necessary for group formation (e.g., Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980; Turner, Sachdev, & Hogg, 1983). These studies revealed that providing individuals with even the most minimal of shared identities—ones based on trivial criteria (e.g., preferring one artist over another) or explicitly random criteria (e.g, a coin toss)—was sufficient to generate in-group attachment and out-group discrimination. The ethnocentric biases in perception, evaluation, and memory demonstrated in these experiments could not have stemmed from attachment to individual group members: Subjects did not know, nor did they have any contact with, the other members of their group.

In recent years, these two very different conceptions of groups have typically been seen as providing competing accounts of group formation and cohesion (see Hogg, 1993; Moreland, 1987; Turner et al., 1987, for reviews). Individualists, who focus primarily on member attachment, do not need and, in the extreme case, do not even believe in direct attachment to the group itself. Social identity theorists, in contrast, do not need attachments between group members in order to claim the existence of a group. Recognition of this divergence in perspectives has led researchers to propose that direct attachment to the group (what we will call *group attachment*) and attachment to group members (what we will call *member attachment*) are two separate dimensions of group definition and cohesion (see Carron & Chelladurai, 1981; Hogg & Hardie, 1991; Karasawa, 1991; and Piper, Marrache, Lacroix, Richardsen, & Jones, 1983, for related distinctions). The majority of these researchers have tended to emphasize the importance of the former relative to the latter (e.g., Hogg & Hardie, 1991; Piper et al., 1983), although others have argued for a consideration of their interplay (e.g., Moreland, 1987).

In our research, we consider the relation between these two dimensions of attachment to be a defining property of groups. We distinguish between *common-bond groups*, which are based primarily on attachments among group members, and *common-identity groups*, which are based primarily on direct attachments to the group identity (see Jennings, 1947, for a related distinction). Common-bond groups are the groups to which Allport referred, in which attachment to the group is largely isomorphic with attachment to fellow group members. In these groups, the strength of group attachment depends critically on the extent to which one knows, likes, and feels similar to other members of the group, as well as the extent to which the group as a whole is seen as homogeneous (see, e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Lott & Lott, 1965; Lott, 1961; Newcomb, 1961, 1968). In common-bond groups, member attachment is primary, and group attachment follows from it; therefore, group attachment should never be stronger than member attachment and should be highly correlated with any and all evaluations of individual group members. Common-identity groups, in contrast, are more similar to Tajfel's minimal groups, in which attachment to the group is largely independent of attachment to fellow group members. In these groups, the strength of group attachment depends first and foremost on one's commitment to the identity of the group. Common-identity groups should be characterized by group attachment that is considerably stronger than member attachment and that is relatively independent of evaluations of individual group members.[1]

The two studies reported in this article sought to validate this distinction between common-bond and common-identity groups. In both, we surveyed members of real-world groups that we had reason to believe, on the basis of their dynamics or functions, would exemplify the distinction. Our aim was not to develop a theory of why groups vary in the types of attachment they foster or of the conditions under which the two types of groups are likely to develop; these efforts, in our view, would be premature (although we do comment on these issues in the General Discussion). Instead, we simply sought to demonstrate that the distinction between common-bond and common-identity groups is meaningful and to explore some of the characteristics of these two types of groups. We began with the hypothesis that members of common-bond and common-identity groups would show asymmetries in their attachments to their group versus to their fellow group members, with relatively stronger group attachment in common-identity groups and relatively stronger member attachment in common-bond groups. We also predicted stronger relations of group attachment to member attachment and to other evaluations of individual group members in common-bond than in common-identity groups.

STUDY 1

In looking for groups that might qualify as common-bond and common-identity groups, we first considered

the eating clubs at Princeton University. The Princeton eating clubs are a set of 12 independently run, nonprofit institutions that are unique to Princeton University. These clubs have provided three meals a day for third- and fourth-year students, and parties on weekends for the whole student body, for the past century. First- and second-year students at Princeton are not permitted to join the eating clubs, and the university both provides and mandates a meal contract that accommodates these students. The situation for third- and fourth-year students is quite different. Despite the de jure separation of the clubs from the university, the university acknowledges the de facto link by providing neither a dining system nor a dining hall for these students: They are expected to join, and, indeed, over 85% do join, an eating club.

The eating clubs are divided into nonselective and selective clubs. Seven of the clubs maintain their membership with a lottery system by which students in the spring of their second year sign into the club of their choice. These are the nonselective, or "sign-in," clubs. The remaining five clubs select their members from a pool of students who elect to "bicker," or interview, at the clubs of their choice. For these "bicker clubs," members are selected during a 2½-day bicker process that takes place once a year.

With respect to their facilities and their role in campus life, the bicker and sign-in clubs are very similar. The club life of their members is also similar: Although members do not reside in their clubs, most of their social life revolves around the club and occurs in the company of their fellow club members. Despite these common features, the group dynamics of the two types of clubs strike us as markedly different (an impression shared by the student body). In particular, bicker clubs appear to conform much more to traditional, individualist assumptions about what makes for a cohesive group: Bicker clubs are seen as more homogeneous, more insular, and, indeed, more close-knit than sign-in clubs. Sign-in clubs are seen as collections of diverse individuals whose attachment to the club is much less dependent on their similarity or attraction to their fellow club members. In short, sign-in clubs appear to be common-identity groups, whereas bicker clubs appear to be common-bond groups.

The purpose of Study 1 was to examine these impressions further. Specifically, we wished to test the hypothesis that bicker and sign-in clubs differ not just in the strength of their in-group attachments but also in the nature of those attachments. We expected to find asymmetries in attachments to the club versus club members, such that members of bicker clubs would show levels of attachment to fellow club members that equaled or exceeded their attachment to the club itself, and members of sign-in clubs would show lower levels of attachment to the members than to the club. We also expected club attachment to correlate more strongly with member attachment and with interpersonal similarity for members of bicker clubs than for members of sign-in clubs.

Method

Subjects. A total of 176 undergraduates (77 women, 99 men) in their third year at Princeton participated in this study. They were approached during mealtime at their eating clubs and were asked to fill out a brief questionnaire. Data were collected at two bicker clubs and two sign-in clubs, with sample sizes ranging from 42 to 47 students at each club.

Procedure. Subjects complete a questionnaire that included items designed to measure their attachment to the club, their attachment to other club members, and their similarity to other club members. The first two of these constructs were assessed with items adapted from Karasawa (1991), whose distinction between identification with the group membership and identification with other group members mapped nicely onto our own. The questions concerning club attachment were as follows:

1. How important is belonging to your eating club to you?
2. How accurate would it be to describe you as a typical member of your club?
3. How often do you acknowledge the fact that you are a member of your club?
4. How good would you feel if you were described as a typical member of your club?
5. How often do you mention your club when you first meet someone?
6. To what extent do you feel attachment to your club?

Subjects responded to each item by circling a number on an appropriately labeled 9-point scale; higher numbers always corresponded to more positive responses. Each subject's responses to these six items were averaged to form a single index of club attachment ($\alpha = .85$).

Member attachment was assessed with the following three items:

1. How close do you feel to the other members of your eating club?
2. How many members of your club have influenced your thoughts and behaviors?
3. How many of your friends come from your club?

Subjects again responded to each item by circling a number on an appropriately labeled 9-point scale; higher numbers always corresponded to more positive responses. Each subject's responses to these three items were averaged to form a single index of member attachment ($\alpha = .80$).

In addition, the questionnaire included a single item to measure perceived similarity:

1. How similar are you to the other members of your club?

Subjects indicated their similarity to other club members on a 9-point scale (1 = *not at all similar*, 9 = *very similar*).

Results and Discussion

To confirm the distinction between club and member attachment, we conducted a factor analysis of the nine items used to assess these constructs. Much to our surprise, this factor analysis yielded only one factor. Separate factor analyses within bicker and sign-in clubs revealed the reason for this unexpected outcome: The analyses yielded two factors (as predicted) in the sign-in clubs and only one factor in the bicker clubs. This result was completely consistent with our theoretical analysis, but it did raise some question about whether we could treat club and member attachment as separate constructs across both types of clubs. We resolved to proceed with the analyses as planned; the results should be interpreted in light of the fact that club and member attachment were not factorially distinct in the bicker clubs.

We hypothesized that bicker and sign-in clubs would differ qualitatively in the nature of their in-group attachment. Specifically, we expected to find asymmetries in attachments to clubs versus club members, such that bicker club members would show greater attachment to club members than to the club and sign-in club members would show greater attachment to the club than to the members. Means and standard deviations for the indexes of club and member attachment are presented in Table 1. An initial analysis revealed no significant gender differences, and so we collapsed across male and female respondents. A 2 (Club Type) × 2 (Attachment Type) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with clubs nested within club type, yielded the predicted Club Type × Attachment Type interaction; with subjects as random, $F(1, 172) = 4.39$, $p < .05$; with clubs as random, $F(1, 2) = 433.01$, $p < .005$. Bicker club members expressed greater attachment to club members than to the club itself; with subjects as random, $F(1, 172) = 3.61$, $p < .06$; with clubs as random, $F(1, 2) = 356.57$, $p < .005$. Sign-in club members showed the reverse pattern of club and member attachment; with subjects as random, $F(1, 172) = 1.10$, $p > .10$; with clubs as random, $F(1, 2) = 98.69$, $p < .01$. The subject analysis also revealed a significant main effect of club type—with subjects as random, $F(1, 172) = 11.79$, $p > .001$; with clubs as random, $F(1, 2) = 2.01$, $p > .10$—indicating that bicker club members showed

TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Club Attachment and Member Attachment for Members of Bicker and Sign-in Clubs, Study 1

Club		Club Attachment	Member Attachment
Bicker club #1	M	5.51	5.76
	SD	1.47	1.56
Bicker club #2	M	6.56	6.76
	SD	1.54	1.42
Combined bicker clubs	M	6.03	6.26
	SD	1.58	1.56
Sign-in club #1	M	5.49	5.36
	SD	1.35	1.42
Sign-in club #2	M	5.51	5.39
	SD	1.38	1.64
Combined sign-in clubs	M	5.50	5.38
	SD	1.37	1.52

NOTE: Indexes of attachment could range from 1 to 9; higher numbers indicate greater attachment.

higher levels of attachment than sign-in club members across both indexes.

To explore further the difference in attachment patterns for members of bicker and sign-in clubs, we examined the relation of club attachment to member attachment and to perceived similarity. We reasoned that if club attachment in bicker clubs derives from bonds between club members, then it should depend heavily on the strength of member attachment and on perceived similarity to other club members. Club attachment in sign-in clubs, however, should be more independent of member attachment and perceived similarity. We therefore expected higher correlations of club attachment with member attachment and with perceived similarity in bicker clubs than in sign-in clubs. We conducted two regression analyses, one predicting club attachment from club type, member attachment, and their interaction and the other predicting club attachment from club type, perceived similarity, and their interaction. The interaction terms tested our hypotheses. The correlations between club attachment and member attachment were .74 in bicker clubs and .73 in sign-in clubs; the correlations between club attachment and perceived similarity were .62 in bicker clubs and .57 in sign-in clubs. Although both these differences were in the right direction, the regressions indicated that neither was significant, both $Fs(1, 172) < 1.70$, $ps > .20$.

One final set of analyses provided a further test of the utility of the patterns of club and member attachment for distinguishing between the two types of clubs. We performed two discriminant analyses, using responses on the attachment questions to predict club membership and club-type membership. If the differential patterns of club and member attachment in bicker and sign-in clubs constitute evidence of a qualitative difference between the two types of groups, then it should be

possible to classify individuals as members of bicker or sign-in clubs on the basis of their responses to the nine attachment questions. Separate discriminant analyses were conducted to test this logic, one to classify individuals as members of one of the four specific clubs and the other to classify them as members of either a bicker or a sign-in club. These analyses used equal prior probabilities. The results indicated that group membership could be predicted quite well from a linear combination of responses to the attachment questions: 52% of subjects were classified into the appropriate eating club (chance level being 25%), and 66% were classified into the appropriate club type (chance level being 50%). Considered individually, six of the nine attachment questions were significant predictors of club type.

Taken together, the results of Study 1 support a qualitative distinction in the in-group attachment of bicker and sign-in clubs but provide less clear-cut evidence of the nature of that distinction. The observed asymmetries in attachments to the club and to club members, as well as the utility of the attachment measures for predicting club membership, suggest that bicker and sign-in clubs are indeed characterized by different types of in-group attachment. Our initial assumption that this difference is captured by the distinction between common-bond groups and common-identity groups received mixed support: The patterns of club and member attachment in the two types of clubs were consistent with our predictions, but the correlational evidence was not. Nevertheless, the enormous degree of similarity in the structure and function of the two types of clubs no doubt militated against our finding any club differences. Consequently, in light of the generally promising evidence for our proposed distinction, we conducted a second study to explore it further.

STUDY 2

In Study 2, we again surveyed members of campus groups about their attachment to their group and to their fellow group members, but this time we sampled across a much broader range of groups, including sports teams, residential units, performing arts groups, and social clubs. We categorized groups as common bond or common identity a priori on the basis of their primary function: Groups that serve to build friendships were considered common-bond groups; groups that are organized around a common interest or activity were considered common-identity groups. We again predicted asymmetries in group and member attachment across the two types of groups and differences in the relation of group attachment to member attachment and to perceived similarity. In addition, we included measures of perceived value homogeneity, perceived value similarity, and knowledge of group members, which were also hypothesized to differ in their relation to group attachment in the two types of groups.

The purposes of this study were twofold: First, we sought stronger evidence for the distinction between common-bond and common-identity groups than was obtained in Study 1. Second, we sought to generalize the results of our first study beyond the eating clubs. Although the bicker and sign-in clubs are similar in most respects, the nature of their in-group attachment is not the only feature that distinguishes between them. In particular, one of the primary differences between the two types of clubs is how members join them: Bicker clubs involve an extended and rigorous interview process after which new members are selected by the group; sign-in clubs are nonselective and require no effort to join. As a result, bicker club members know one another well when they enter the group, whereas sign-in club members are relative strangers. These differences alone could account for the pattern of results that we observed (see Aronson & Mills, 1959; Gerard & Matthewson, 1966). Hence, an additional purpose of Study 2 was to extend our exploration of group and member attachment beyond groups that differ in selectivity.

Method

Subjects. A total of 270 undergraduates voluntarily attended a mass testing session, in which they participated in this and other short studies for pay. The sample contained 167 women and 103 men, with approximately even distribution of women and men across the first- through fourth-year classes.

Procedure. Subjects completed a questionnaire very similar to that used in Study 1. They were first asked to think of a group or organization of which they considered themselves a member and to name that group. Then they were asked the same nine attachment questions and the perceived similarity question that were used in Study 1 with respect to the group they listed (i.e., "How important is belonging to this group to you?," etc.).

After completing the attachment and similarity questions, subjects were asked to rate the importance of each of the following values in their own lives: social justice, accepting my position in life, choosing own goals, humbleness, protecting the environment, honoring parents and elders, preserving my public image, an exciting life, social recognition, freedom, enjoying life, loyalty, daring, true friendship, sense of belonging, independence, equality, family security, a varied life, social order, and self-discipline. Subjects rated each value on a 9-point scale (1 = *not at all important*; 9 = *of supreme importance*). These values were taken from Triandis, McCusker, and Hui (1990), who found that they distinguished between

people with an individualist orientation and people with a collectivist orientation. We were not interested here in individual subjects' endorsement of the values per se; instead, we simply wished to use the values as a domain for judgments of group homogeneity and similarity.

Finally, subjects were asked three additional questions about their group:

1. How much do members of this group agree on the importance of the values listed?
2. How similar are their values to yours?
3. How well do you know the members of this group?

Subjects responded to each question on an appropriately labeled 9-point scale; higher numbers indicated more agreement, more similarity, and more knowledge, respectively.

Results and Discussion

Subjects identified a diverse set of groups to which they belonged, as listed in Table 2. For 230 of the 270 subjects, the group they identified was classified as either a common-bond group or a common-identity group. Common-bond groups were residential units and social clubs, including fraternities, sororities, and eating clubs. Common-identity groups were performing arts groups (e.g., dance troupes, drama clubs, film societies), music groups, media groups (e.g., newspaper staffs, yearbook staff), and sports teams. We did not classify groups defined by social category membership (e.g., religious groups, ethnic groups, women's groups) or off-campus groups (primarily military groups and service organizations), because we wanted to restrict consideration to group allegiances that students had formed since coming to Princeton. In addition, 7 subjects listed groups that we could not identify, and 5 failed to list any group at all.

In light of the results of our first study, we conducted a separate factor analysis of the nine attachment items within each type of group. Results paralleled those of Study 1: The analyses yielded two factors in common-identity groups and only one factor in common-bond groups. This result was theoretically encouraging but empirically problematic. Again, we resolved to treat group and member attachment as separate constructs and averaged subjects' responses to the relevant questions, as in Study 1; these indexes were highly reliable (α = .84 for group attachment and .84 for member attachment). It is important, however, to bear in mind that group attachment and member attachment were not factorially distinct in common-bond groups.

We hypothesized that members of common-bond and common-identity groups would show asymmetries in attachments to their groups versus their fellow group members. Means and standard deviations for the two

TABLE 2: Groups Identified by Subjects in Study 2

Type of Group	Number of Subjects
Common-bond groups	98
Resident assistant	37
Social groups (fraternities, sororities, eating clubs)	61
Common-identity groups	132
Performing arts groups	9
Music groups	22
Media groups (newspaper and magazine staffs, yearbook staff)	16
Sports teams	85
Unclassified	35
Groups defined by social category membership (ethnic groups, religious groups, women's groups)	17
Off-campus groups (service organizations, military groups)	11
Unidentifiable	7
No group listed	5

indexes are presented in Table 3. A 2 (Subject Gender) × 2 (Group Type) × 2 (Attachment Type) ANOVA yielded the predicted Group Type × Attachment Type interaction, $F(1, 225) = 56.47, p < .0001$.[2] Members of common-identity groups were more attached to their group than to their fellow group members, $F(1, 225) = 129.89, p < .0001$, whereas members of common-bond groups did not differ in these two types of attachment, $F < 1$. The analysis also revealed main effects of gender, $F(1, 225) = 4.03, p < .05$, and of attachment type, $F(1, 225) = 48.59, p < .0001$, as well as interactions of gender with group type, $F(1, 225) = 7.16, p < .01$, and with attachment type, $F(1, 225) = 6.80, p < .01$. These additional effects indicated that men expressed stronger attachment of both types in common-identity groups and women in common-bond groups and that, across groups, women expressed more group attachment than member attachment relative to men. But the predicted interaction of group type and attachment type held across both male and female respondents; for the Gender × Group Type × Attachment Type interaction, $F(1, 225) = 2.32, p > .10$.

In addition to differences in the relative levels of group and member attachment in the two types of groups, we again predicted that group attachment would show a stronger relation to member attachment and to perceived similarity in common-bond than in common-identity groups. We expected similar group differences in the relation of group attachment to perceived value homogeneity, perceived value similarity, and knowledge of group members.[3] Correlations of group attachment with these measures are shown in Table 4. We conducted separate regression analyses to predict group attachment from each of these five measures, group type, and the interaction of the measure with group type (i.e., one analysis regressed group attachment on member attach-

TABLE 3: Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Group Attachment and Member Attachment for Members of Common-Bond Groups and Common-Identity Groups, Study 2

Type of Group		Group Attachment	Member Attachment
Common-bond groups			
Women ($n = 65$)	M	6.01	5.96
	SD	1.62	1.65
Men ($n = 33$)	M	4.85	5.00
	SD	1.96	1.97
Total	M	5.62	5.64
	SD	1.81	1.81
Common-identity groups			
Women ($n = 73$)	M	6.34	4.67
	SD	1.37	2.14
Men ($n = 58$)	M	6.12	5.19
	SD	1.48	1.96
Total	M	6.25	4.92
	SD	1.42	2.08

NOTE: Indexes of attachment could range from 1 to 9; higher numbers indicate greater attachment.

TABLE 4: Correlates of Group Attachment in Common-Bond Groups and Common-Identity Groups, Study 2

Predictor of Group Attachment	Common-Bond Groups	Common-Identity Groups
Member attachment	.82	.70
Perceived similarity	.64	.59
Perceived value homogeneity	.49	.30
Perceived value similarity	.63	.38
Knowledge of group members	.56	.47

ment, group type, and the interaction of member attachment and group type; another analysis regressed group attachment on perceived similarity, group type, and the interaction of similarity and group type; and so on). The interaction terms tested for group differences in the relation of group attachment to each measure. In all cases, these interactions were significant: For member attachment, $F(1, 226) = 22.62$, $p < .0001$; for perceived similarity, $F(1, 226) = 6.78$, $p < .01$; for value homogeneity, $F(1, 224) = 4.99$, $p < .05$; for value similarity, $F(1, 224) = 11.25$, $p < .001$; for knowledge of group members, $F(1, 226) = 9.70$, $p < .005$. Thus, attachment to the group was more strongly related to all evaluations of individual group members in common-bond than in common-identity groups.

Finally, we performed a discriminant analysis to predict membership in common-bond or common-identity groups from responses to the attachment questions. Our assumption, as in Study 1, was that if common-bond and common-identity groups differ qualitatively in the nature of their in-group attachment, then it should be possible to discriminate between them on the basis of members' responses to the group and member attachment measures. A discriminant analysis was conducted, using equal prior probabilities, to classify individuals as members of one of these two types of groups on the basis of a linear combination of their responses to the nine attachment questions. The results indicated that 77% of subjects were correctly classified into a common-bond or a common-identity group (chance level being 50%). Considered individually, seven of the nine attachment questions were significant predictors of group type. These results again support the validity of our proposed distinction.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The finding that some real-world groups appear to be based on direct attachment to the group and others on attachments to fellow group members is significant in a number of respects. First, and most obviously, this finding provides a way of reconciling competing conceptions of the group. In our surveys of members of real-world groups, we found some support for the individualist assumptions that member attachment is dominant and that the group and its members are largely isomorphic (Allport, 1924, 1962; Lott & Lott, 1965; Lott, 1961). However, we also found support for the social identity theory assumptions that group attachment is dominant and that the group and its members are functionally independent (see Turner et al., 1987). Thus, rather than competing accounts for group formation and cohesion, these perspectives might instead be viewed as describing two separable processes in the development and maintenance of groups, either of which might dominate under a given set of circumstances (see Hogg & Abrams, 1989).

Second, and following from this first point, the present research supports the view that group dynamics depend critically on how individual members cognitively represent the group (Turner et al., 1987). Our findings, particularly for members of common-identity groups, add to the growing evidence that individuals can have separate representations of their groups and of the members of those groups. This cognitive perspective on the nature of in-group attachment marks a recent shift from the learning perspective that characterizes the individualist approach (see Turner et al., 1987). Whereas the learning view holds that interpersonal bonds, based on mutual need satisfaction, combine piecemeal to determine overall liking for the group, recent studies (e.g., Miller & Felicio, 1990) suggest that one can also evaluate a category or group directly, with no reference to individuals. As researchers continue to explore the group-level and individual-level processes underlying in-group

attachment and other group phenomena, we expect the contributions of these two contrasting perspectives to become increasingly integrated (see Moreland, 1987).

Finally, the present studies do more than just add to the accumulating evidence for the independence of group and member attachment: They suggest that a consideration of the relation of these two types of attachment can provide a meaningful scheme for categorizing groups. Some groups cohere because of the members' attachment to the group itself, and others cohere because of the members' attachment to one another. The relative levels of these two types of attachment and their dependence on each other may provide more insight into the group and its dynamics than a consideration of each type of attachment in isolation. Thus, for example, a simple quantitative characterization of the difference between group and member attachment in the bicker and sign-in clubs investigated in Study 1 would fail to capture the psychological distinctiveness of the two groups, just as a quantitative characterization of the difference between Pope and Swift would fail to capture the psychological distinctiveness of these two individuals. Pope did not simply like mankind more than did Swift, and Swift men more than did Pope; the two writers differed in their relative liking for these two social representations.

Common-Bond and Common-Identity Groups

We have argued for a qualitative distinction between common-bond and common-identity groups.[4] The significance of this distinction rests, in part, on its ability to shed light on observed group differences. In this section, we will examine the implications of the distinction for understanding several of the ways in which groups differ.

First, consider the rules of fairness that operate within groups. Some groups operate on the principle of equity, whereby each individual is entitled to rewards in proportion to his or her contributions to the group. Other groups operate on the principle of equality, whereby each individual is entitled to an equal share of the rewards. Justice researchers have many theories to account for these group differences (see Lerner & Lerner, 1981). We would suggest that what is considered fair in a group depends on whether it is a common-bond or a common-identity group. Common-identity groups, in which members share an attachment to the group, should operate on the principle of equality; common-bond groups, in which attachment is an aggregate of individual bonds, should operate on the principle of equity. Support for this conjecture comes from Lerner (1974). He found that when children were defined as a "team," they tended to distribute rewards equally to fellow team members, whereas when they were defined as "coworkers," they tended to distribute rewards to other coworkers in proportion to their contributions. We

would expect common-identity groups to function like teams and common-bond groups to function like coworkers, regardless of their quantitative levels of cohesion.[5]

A second property that varies across groups is their longevity. Again, the distinction between common-bond and common-identity groups may account for why some groups last longer than others. Because attachment in common-bond groups is determined by relations between individuals, the existence of the group depends critically on the individual members and how they relate to each other. Attachment in common-identity groups is more independent of the current roster of group members. We would therefore expect common-identity groups to show greater continuity over time and greater stability in the face of changes in membership. Consistent with this analysis, observations of real-world groups implicate attachment to a collective goal or identity as an important factor in sustaining a group. For example, social movement researchers have noted that participants must have a common identity that constitutes a significant portion of their social existence to sustain collective action (see Blumer, 1953; Scott, 1990; Turner & Killian, 1957). Similarly, studies of utopian communities have revealed that enduring communities tend to have strong group identities and to discourage intimate dyadic relations that could threaten allegiance to the group (Kanter, 1972). It is important to note, however, that these communities do not survive on group attachment alone: When commitment to the concerns of the collective weakens interpersonal bonds, the communities often fail.

Finally, groups differ in their reactions to conflict. Some groups rally in the face of internal discord or external threat; other groups disintegrate at the first sign of trouble. We would argue that which of these courses a group follows depends, in part, on whether it is a common-bond or a common-identity group. In cases of internal conflict, common-identity groups should fare much better than common-bond groups, because common-identity groups do not depend on, nor do they necessarily require, interpersonal harmony. Common-bond groups are unlikely to withstand internal discord, as it threatens the basis for their existence. In cases of external conflict, the predictions are less clear. One interesting possibility is that an external threat may serve to give the group a common cause and thus may transform common-bond groups, temporarily or permanently, into common-identity groups (see Coser, 1956). Indeed, although researchers of intergroup conflict have tended to adopt an individualist perspective, we would suggest that conflict increases in-group attachment not only by strengthening bonds between individuals but also by strengthening bonds to the group (see also Turner et al., 1987).

Group and Member Attachment Over Time

Although the present research examined the nature of in-group attachment by assessing groups at only one point in time, in the real world, the processes through which groups develop and change take place over weeks, months, or even years. It is therefore useful to speculate on the implications of our findings for the more dynamic aspects of in-group attachment. In line with the distinction between common-bond and common-identity groups, one can distinguish between accounts of group development that are bottom-up and top-down in focus. Bottom-up accounts suggest that group attachment is an emergent feature of attachment to group members: Once there are sufficient interpersonal bonds among a collection of individuals, they will become a group. Top-down accounts suggest that group attachment originates in social categorization and leads to, rather than follows from, interpersonal bonds (see also Miller & Felicio, 1990). In recent years, research has tended to favor the top-down over the bottom-up accounts. In particular, as we have noted, researchers in the social identity tradition have shown that social categorization alone, in the absence of interpersonal attachment, is *sufficient* to promote in-group attachment (see Turner et al., 1987, for a review). Some researchers have gone further to argue that social categorization is a *necessary* condition for group formation (Hogg & Turner, 1985a, 1985b), but the empirical basis for this claim is not yet well established.

Although laboratory evidence for the importance of social categorization in group formation is quite strong, its role in the formation of real-world groups is less clear-cut. In the common-bond groups examined in the present studies, for example, the attachment experienced by group members did not seem to derive from attachment to the group. We would therefore argue that social categorization may not always precede individual attachment; instead, collections of individuals who have strong attachments to one another may be motivated to identify categories they share in order to give themselves a common identity. In this case, the category is an effect of their interpersonal attachment, rather than a cause of it. As an example, one of us attended a conference in which Henri Tajfel and Robert Zajonc were presenting. As Tajfel introduced Zajonc, he made reference to the fact that they were both members of a very select group: individuals having the letter combination *aj* in their last names. From Tajfel's work, we know that such a designation would meet the minimal requirements for a group identity. But surely the identification of this shared category reflected a bond that was already present. We have here a case of a group in search of an identity. This identity did not create the bond between Tajfel and Zajonc; it merely codified it.

Groups that exist at the level of member attachment may nevertheless have a social identity. Take, as an example, groups of people who call a radio station to request a song. These groups frequently identify themselves with category labels: "the guys in Ivy 222" or "the mechanics at Al's garage" or "the gang at Sam's Bar and Grill." But, in fact, these individuals request songs together not because of their attachment to their category but because of their attachment to one another. The group identity they have created simply formalizes their status as a friendship group. They may be categorized as the guys in Ivy 222 or the gang at Sam's by others and by themselves, but their attachment to this group derives entirely from their interpersonal bonds. Not all coworkers or roommates will request songs together; only those with close interpersonal attachments will consider themselves a meaningful group.

The present results certainly do not prove that groups can exist without a collective identity, and there may, in fact, be a number of group functions that require one (collective action, for example). But the results for common-bond groups do suggest that a collective identity need not be the driving force behind a group and may be an effect, rather than a cause, of the interpersonal bonds between group members. Consequently, we would simply suggest that common-bond groups deserve the status of real groups and are worthy of study. They surely will not function like groups with strong identities, but this fact alone should not disqualify them as groups, nor should it mark them as less-developed groups. Instead, it should motivate their investigation. Defining the group so as to exclude those based on interpersonal bonds will not alter the fact that individuals identify such collections of people as groups and define themselves as members of those groups.

NOTES

1. We should note that self-categorization theory would make similar predictions about attachment in these two types of groups (see Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, this issue). It would suggest that, in common-identity groups, group identity is salient, and therefore intergroup comparisons, in which distinctions are made between rather than within groups, are relevant. In common-bond groups, by contrast, group identity is not salient, and therefore intragroup comparisons, based on distinctions among group members, are relevant. We have no quarrel with this account for the processes involved; we simply wish to make the argument that these processes produce qualitatively different types of groups.

2. In Study 2, analyses were carried out at the individual level rather than at the group level, because subjects came from many different groups and it was not possible to ascertain common-group membership.

3. Although we were not interested in subjects' own endorsement of the values, we did analyze for group differences in their personal value orientations. An initial factor analysis of the value ratings, using a varimax rotation and specifying two factors, divided the values into the following categories: Individualistic values were choosing own goals, preserving my public image, an exciting life, social recognition, freedom, enjoying life, daring, independence, and a varied life (α = .70). Collectivistic values were social justice, accepting my position in

life, humbleness, protecting the environment, honoring parents and elders, loyalty, true friendship, sense of belonging, equality, family security, social order, and self-discipline (α = .68). (This division is largely, though not completely, consistent with that suggested by Triandis, McCusker, and Hui, 1990). ANOVAs indicated no group differences in endorsement of either individualistic or collectivistic values, both $Fs(1, 224) < 2.00$, $ps > .10$.

4. In the real world, these two types of groups mark opposite poles of a continuum, but for simplicity, we will treat the distinction as dichotomous.

5. Of course, common-identity groups may also be more likely than common-bond groups to have role differentiation within the group, which will militate against the equal distribution of resources.

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